




FREEDOM BY DESIGN:  OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
JONATHAN M. PHILLIPS†
INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1980s, the institution of public broadcasting has been 
subject to continuing criticism, particularly by those who are con-
cerned that it is ideologically biased.1  In 2005, public broadcasting 
was in the limelight yet again when it was discovered that the Chair-
man of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), Kenneth 
Tomlinson, secretly hired a consultant to monitor PBS programming 
for partisan biases.2  In the name of “balance,”3 Tomlinson’s project 
examined the programs of Bill Moyers, Tavis Smiley, and Diane 
Reihm, and rated their guests according to whether they were liberal 
or conservative.4  Related (and perhaps more obviously alarming) 
 † B.A. 2002, University of Pennsylvania; M.Sc. 2003, London School of Economics 
and Political Science; J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I’d 
like to thank Professor C. Edwin Baker for providing the inspiration for, and invalu-
able comments on, this piece, and the entire staff of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review for their work on this Comment.  Most importantly, I’d like to thank my fiancée 
and family for their support, particularly in listening to the rants that provided the ba-
sis for this piece.  All errors, of course, are my own. 
1 See Editorial, Squelching Public Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2005, at A22 
(noting Newt Gingrich’s efforts ten years before to eliminate funding for public 
broadcasting because of its “liberal bias,” and reporting on continuing attacks on the 
organization). 
2 See Lisa de Moraes, Scrutiny of Broadcast Agency Chief Intensifies, WASH. POST, July 
13, 2005, at C1 (describing growing concern among members of Congress about the 
project’s examination of the “political leanings” of guests on certain public broadcast-
ing programs). 
3 The Corporation for Public Broadcasting has statutory authority to facilitate the 
development of programming “with strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all 
programs or series of programs of a controversial nature.”  47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) 
(2000).  Tomlinson relied on this “balance” justification to explain his activities, which 
included pushing PBS to create a conservative talk show featuring editorialists from the 
Wall Street Journal.  See Editorial, Politicizing Public Broadcasting, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2005, 
at A22 (noting that as a result of his efforts, many stations took on both Now with Bill 
Moyers and the Wall Street Journal show). 
4 CORP. FOR PUB. BROAD. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REVIEW OF ALLEGED AC-
TIONS VIOLATING THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT OF 1967, AS AMENDED, REP. NO. 
EPB503-602, at 8 (Nov. 15, 2005). 
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categories asked whether program guests were pro- or anti-
administration, as well as “pro-Bush versus anti-Bush.”5
After a report on the impropriety of Tomlinson’s activities by the 
CPB’s Inspector General, Tomlinson resigned from his post.6  Public 
concerns have not abated with his departure, though.  While some see 
more political pressure on the horizon because of the Republican-
dominated CPB board,7 others may simply note these are difficulties 
inherent in the institution of public broadcasting, regardless of its 
partisan makeup.8  Regardless of the argument, however, it is clear 
that the interplay between governance and programming content 
choices raises salient First Amendment issues of editorial autonomy 
and independence from government influence.9
While the incident leading to Tomlinson’s departure may not it-
self present a justiciable issue, it points to a significant dilemma re-
lated to the structure of public broadcasting.  That is, the system is 
supposed to be independent, yet nearly half of the state public broad-
casters are run by the government, and the President appoints the 
leadership of the CPB.  As a result, the possibility appears to remain 
that ruling political interests could exercise significant influence on 
the system by regulating speech directly, or indirectly through fund-
ing conditions.  In developing noncommercial broadcasting institu-
tions, however, Congress clearly intended to insulate programming 
5 Id. 
6 See Paul Farhi, Kenneth Tomlinson Quits Public Broadcasting Board, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 4, 2005, at C1 (providing an overview of the reasons for which Tomlinson was 
asked to leave, after the release of the Inspector General’s report). 
7 See Editorial, Public Broadcasting’s Enemy Within, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at A18 
(describing Tomlinson’s political ties to the Republican party and noting that Republi-
cans still control the CPB). 
8 See, e.g., Editorial, Liberate PBS, CHI. TRIB., May 9, 2005, at A14 (positing that, be-
cause of the declining quality of programming in a landscape with many more chan-
nels than thirty years ago, federal funding of public broadcasting is more trouble than 
it’s worth). 
9 Though this Comment will focus on the American system of public broadcasting, 
it is worthwhile to note that the problem of corporate governance with respect to pub-
lic broadcasting affects other countries’ systems as well.  See David Liddiment, Televi-
sion:  Providing a Popular Public Service, THE GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 14, 2005, at 8 
(“[P]ress comment has focused on structural matters, in particular whether re-
engineering the BBC governors into a Trust will fix the conflict of interest at the heart 
of BBC governance.”).  This may suggest that the problems raised here regarding the 
separation of editorial decision making from political pressures (or lack thereof) are 
inherent in the very concept of public broadcasting.  However, this phenomenon is 
outside the scope of this Comment. 
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decisions from such pressures, so that individual broadcasters could 
freely pursue the variety of social roles for public broadcasting. 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court’s traditional First 
Amendment analysis cannot provide a solution to this potential con-
tradiction.  By embracing an analysis of speech restrictions that fo-
cuses on the objective characteristics of the institution in which the 
speech occurs, however, the Court can preserve the autonomy of pub-
lic broadcasters and make protection of speech more robust under its 
precedents.  Furthermore, when applied at the state and federal levels 
of public broadcasting, such an approach may lead to the conclusion 
that programming decisions made to advance partisan interests are 
presumptively invalid under the First Amendment. 
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the social roles 
and functions of the public broadcasting system in the United States 
and considers how that system came into existence.  Part II explains 
why the Supreme Court’s traditional First Amendment jurisprudence 
is poorly equipped to address issues that might exist in reality or in 
theory.  Taking off from the Court’s opinions in FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of California and Arkansas Education Television Commission 
v. Forbes, Part III then proposes a First Amendment approach that con-
siders the objective characteristics of how an institution is organized to 
determine how the Court’s precedents should apply to it.  Part IV 
then applies this approach to the U.S. public broadcasting system at 
both the federal and state levels, examining the Corporation for Pub-
lic Broadcasting and New Jersey public television as case studies.  Fi-
nally, Part V offers a brief summary and conclusion. 
I.  PUBLIC BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
HISTORY AND OVERVIEW 
A.  The Structure of the Public Broadcasting Institution 
The American system of public broadcasting operates at three in-
terconnected levels.10  First, individual noncommercial stations make 
up the local “bottom” level.  These stations receive their broadcast li-
censes from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and are 
subject to the same regulations as commercial broadcasters, though 
10 Because these three levels are so firmly linked together, in this Comment I will 
refer to the entire chain described here as the “public broadcasting system” or the 
“public broadcasting institution.”  I do not intend to confuse it with the second link in 
that chain–-the Public Broadcasting System-–which is described infra Part IV. 
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they receive some special treatment in the form of mandated carriage 
on cable and satellite distribution systems.11  These stations are often 
licensed to universities and community organizations but are also held 
by executive agencies within the state governments.12
Second, at the national level, most of these local noncommercial 
licensees are members of the Public Broadcasting System (PBS), an 
ostensibly private, nonprofit corporation.13  PBS’s primary mission is 
acquiring programming for distribution to its member broadcasters 
and providing fundraising, promotional, and logistical support.14  PBS 
makes its own decisions about what programming will be made avail-
able;15 the decision of whether to broadcast that content, however, is 
ultimately made by each individual station, based on its own needs.16  
In addition to the programming they receive from PBS, local stations 
can create their own programming as well.17
Finally, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB) is, first 
and foremost, the funding arm of the public broadcasting institu-
tion.18  Its primary mission is to provide support for local noncom-
mercial stations by financing the development of quality program-
11 LAURA R. LINDER, PUBLIC ACCESS TELEVISION:  AMERICA’S ELECTRONIC SOAPBOX 
7-13 (1999) (discussing the FCC’s role in regulating public broadcast television amidst 
strong growth of local stations). 
12 Thirteen states have public broadcasting systems overseen by state government 
agencies or commissions.  See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
13 For the sake of clarity, I am focusing on public broadcast television.  Noncom-
mercial radio in the United States is structured very similarly; its programming is dis-
tributed by National Public Radio (NPR) and, like PBS, is funded in part by the Cor-
poration for Public Broadcasting. 
14 The package of programming sent to local stations is called the National Pro-
gramming Service.  PBS does not create any programming itself, and its programs are 
compiled from individual member stations and outside content producers.  See Public 
Broadcasting Service, About PBS:  Corporate Facts,  http://www.pbs.org/aboutpbs/ 
aboutpbs_corp.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (providing an overview of PBS’s mem-
ber stations, audience, and programming activities). 
15 Id. 
16 See Public Broadcasting Service, About PBS:  FAQs, http://www.pbs.org/ 
aboutpbs/aboutpbs_faqanswers.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (noting that each PBS 
member station “schedules [its] programming independently”). 
17 See, e.g., About WHYY, http://www.whyy.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) 
(noting that WHYY, the Philadelphia public broadcaster, creates both local and na-
tional programming). 
18 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2) (2000) (authorizing the distribution of federal funds 
to noncommercial television stations and content providers). 
  
2007] FREEDOM BY DESIGN 995 
 
ming and providing logistical and technological support.19  To that 
end, the CPB funds station initiatives aimed at determining how non-
commercial stations can better serve their local communities and en-
sures that the programming it finances also serves community needs.20  
In supporting the development of content, the CPB seeks to further 
three particular interests:  (1) providing children’s programming with 
a high educational value, (2) serving “underserved audiences,” and 
(3) contributing to a better-informed citizenry at the national and lo-
cal levels.21  In addition to financial support, the CPB engages in re-
search endeavors to help guide ongoing federal investment in public 
broadcasting. 
B.  The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967:  Constructing a National Institution 
With the creation of a regime for federal support of noncommer-
cial broadcasting, Congress intended to maximize the editorial auton-
omy of individual stations and eliminate the possibility that govern-
ment-–particularly ruling majority parties-–could influence content 
decisions, directly or indirectly.  At the time of the enactment of the 
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, the role that this noncommercial re-
gime was to play in society was not clearly defined, though the possi-
bilities abounded.  As such, legislators offered numerous purposes for 
noncommercial broadcasting without clearly adopting one or linking 
them together in some way.  Rather, the Act focused primarily on the 
structural creation of an autonomous entity in the CPB, perhaps sug-
gesting that it is for the broadcasters themselves to best determine 
their social function by how they choose to operate. 
1.  Defining the Role of the Public Broadcaster 
Myriad justifications for public service broadcasting orbit the uni-
verse of media theory, but they all largely revolve around the idea of 
market failure.  Put simply, market pressures drive private, commer-
cial broadcasters to underproduce certain types of content that are 
thought to be valuable for society.22  With a system of noncommercial 
19 Corporation for Public Broadcasting, CPB:  Goals and Objectives, http:// 
www.cpb.org/aboutcpb/goals/goalsandobjectives/goalsandobjectives_full.html (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2007). 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See generally ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULA-
TION 7-19 (1973) (noting the economic challenges of public broadcasting); C. Edwin 
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broadcasting, the government can address this problem by removing 
the pressures of an advertising-driven market and by generally pre-
scribing the type of content to be provided. 
Beyond that, however, how the specific social role or function of 
the public broadcaster should be defined appears open for debate.  
Communications scholar Monroe Price, for instance, has offered four 
possible definitions for public television:  (1) as a “Lifeline,” which 
posits that noncommercial television assumes the “residue” of un-
served public interest obligations from commercial broadcasting;23 (2) 
“National Identity,” under which the broadcast system participates in 
the creation of a nation-wide cultural identity; (3) “Minority Satisfac-
tion,” under which the broadcaster provides a voice for underserved 
minorities so that they may feel included in society; and (4) “Public 
Sphere,” which sees the function of noncommercial broadcasting as 
an “instrument of civil society” to facilitate deliberative political de-
bate.24  Noncommercial television may also simply be an effective way 
to ensure that the public has access to programming that takes crea-
tive risks and seeks to achieve a higher level of quality and inspira-
tion.25
2.  Building an Autonomous Institution:  Passage of the 1967 Act 
With the passage of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (1967 
Act),26 which created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, Con-
gress sought to correct the “market failure” of commercial broadcast-
ing and, in so doing, provided at least some definition to the role that 
noncommercial broadcasters should play.27  Though local noncom-
Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2113-14 (1992) (dis-
cussing the dominance and importance of advertising in eighteenth-century newspa-
pers); Howard A. White, Fine Tuning the Federal Government’s Role in Public Broadcasting, 
46 FED. COMM. L.J. 491, 496-97 (1994) (describing the Ford Foundation’s efforts to 
promote educational broadcasting). 
23 Monroe E. Price, Public Broadcasting and the Crisis of Corporate Governance, 17 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 417, 427 (1999).  Defining public broadcasters based on 
this “Lifeline” idea would create the opportunity for commercial broadcasters to shed 
their existing public interest obligations altogether.  Id. 
24 Id. at 427-28. 
25 See Meredith C. Hightower, Beyond Lights and Wires in a Box:  Ensuring the Exis-
tence of Public Television, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 133, 137 (1994) (addressing the major aims of 
promoting public television). 
26 Pub. L. No. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-399 
(2000)). 
27 See William D. Rowland Jr., Public Service Broadcasting in the United States:  Its Man-
date, Institutions, and Conflicts, in PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING IN A MULTICHANNEL 
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mercial stations had existed-–and received support from the federal 
government28–-for years, by the late 1960s it appeared that these sta-
tions’ programming efforts were impaired by a lack of funding.29  In 
response to this problem, the Carnegie Corporation sponsored a Con-
gress-supported commission to investigate the status of noncommer-
cial broadcasting nationwide.30  In light of its findings that financially 
healthy local stations would be essential to expanded noncommercial 
broadcasting, the Carnegie Commission called for federal funding to 
supplement existing state and private financing mechanisms.31  The 
Carnegie report also coined the term “public television,” not to dis-
tinguish it as the converse to private commercial broadcasters, but to 
embody a wide range of political, cultural, and educational program-
ming.32
Responding favorably to the Carnegie Commission’s recommen-
dations, Congress passed the 1967 Act, which created a platform for 
the nationwide public broadcasting institution we know today.  In so 
doing, Congress hoped to promote the growth of noncommercial 
broadcasting to serve, inter alia, “instructional, educational, and cul-
tural purposes.”33  The 1967 Act by its terms asserts several apparent 
roles for public broadcasting in the United States.  In its policy decla-
ration, Congress sought to promote the “general welfare” through 
broadcaster responsiveness to the “interests of people . . . in particular 
localities” and the provision of “alternative” services nationwide.34  It 
also asserted the public interest in “encourag[ing] the development of 
ENVIRONMENT:  THE HISTORY AND SURVIVAL OF AN IDEAL 157, 160-61 (Robert K. Avery 
ed., 1993) (examining Congress’s role in the future direction and mandate of the pur-
pose of noncommercial television). 
28 Congress first posited a national system to support noncommercial educational 
stations in the Communications Act of 1934.  See id.  The FCC provided further sup-
port for these stations in the 1950s when it set aside 242 channels strictly for noncom-
mercial educational purposes.  See In re Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commis-
sion’s Rules and Regulations, 41 F.C.C. 148, 158 (1952) (sixth report and order) 
(providing 80 VHF and 162 UHF stations for noncommercial use).  Then, in 1962, 
Congress expanded its support for public broadcasting by offering limited funding for 
educational television with the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962.  Pub. L. 
No. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-395 (2000)). 
29 See Rowland, supra note 27, at 172-181 (addressing the state of funding for pub-
lic broadcasting before the Carnegie Commission). 
30 See generally CARNEGIE COMM’N ON EDUC. TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION:  A 
PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1967). 
31 Id. at 33-37. 
32 Id. at 1. 
33 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1) (2000). 
34 Id. § 396(a)(5). 
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programming that . . . addresses the needs of unserved and under-
served audiences, particularly children and minorities.”35
Underlying all of these interests was also an appeal for program-
ming of particularly high quality, perhaps implicitly acknowledging a 
market failure in this regard.  The Senate noted that programming 
must “approach the highest possible production standards,”36 and 
President Lyndon Johnson hoped that the CPB would assist stations 
“who aim for the best in broadcasting.”37  Furthermore, the Senate as-
serted that “noncommercial broadcasting is uniquely fitted to offer in-
depth coverage and analysis which will lead to a better informed and 
enlightened public.”38
These varied propositions all resonate in three of the different 
definitional approaches identified by Professor Price39 and indicate 
that legislators did not contemplate one all-encompassing definitional 
framework.  The commitment to localism may be a “residual” public 
interest “Lifeline” obligation that commercial broadcasters fail to 
serve.  Second, providing programming for underserved minorities 
certainly gets directly at the “Minority Satisfaction” definition.  Third, 
creating a “better informed and enlightened” citizenry serves Price’s 
“Public Sphere” model. 
Aside from the legislature’s broad normative discussion of the 
aims of public broadcasting, however, the 1967 Act did not focus on 
precisely defining the role of that institution.  Rather, the main fea-
ture of the Act was its creation of the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting, for the purpose of “facilitat[ing] the development of public 
telecommunications and to afford maximum protection from extra-
neous interference and control.”40  Indeed, in both the legislative his-
tory and statutory text, lawmakers concentrated on providing this in-
dependence from government interference with the public 
broadcasting institution.  In signing the 1967 Act, President Johnson 
asserted that the CPB must be “carefully guarded from government or 
35 Id. § 396(a)(6). 
36 S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 7 (1967). 
37 113 CONG. REC. 23, 31587 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1967) (President Johnson’s state-
ments at the signing of the 1967 Act). 
38 S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 7. 
39 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
40 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(10) (2000). 
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party control,”41 and Senator John Pastore, in a Senate Report, ex-
plained that “it is our intention that local stations be absolutely free to 
determine for themselves what they should or should not broadcast.”42  
The Senate Report particularly emphasized the need for autonomy in 
programming choices at the local level, stating that “[l]ocal autonomy 
of stations and diversity of program sources will provide operational 
safeguards to assure the democratic functioning of the system.”43
To maximize the insulation of programming decisions from po-
litical pressures, the 1967 Act created, in the CPB, a “nonprofit corpo-
ration . . . which will not be an agency or establishment of the United 
States Government.”44  The statute set out the structure of the Corpo-
ration by creating a Board of Directors and detailing how its directors 
and officers would be selected.45  The 1967 Act further ensured that 
political affiliation could not be a factor in the President’s choice of 
board members.46  Congress then gave fuller effect to the CPB’s inde-
pendence by establishing a trust for it in the Treasury Department, al-
lowing funds to flow directly to the CPB.47
In providing the framework for a national public broadcasting sys-
tem, Congress clearly intended for the institution—from the CPB at 
the federal level down to the individual local station—to have the ut-
most independence from government influence.  Indeed, editorial 
autonomy and insulation from political pressures constituted the one 
aspect of public broadcasting about which lawmakers appeared so cer-
tain that they built it into the structure of the national system.  Many 
ideas about the social role of noncommercial broadcasting were pre-
sented, but none were embraced as clearly as the notion that whatever 
their role, the broadcasters should have the freedom to choose their 
41 113 CONG. REC. 23, 31587; see also S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 11 (“Noncommercial 
television . . . must be absolutely free from any Federal Government interference over 
programming.”). 
42 S. REP. NO. 90-222, at 11. 
43 Id. at 7-8. 
44 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2000). 
45 See id. § 396(c) (outlining the appointment and structure of the CPB Board of 
Directors). 
46 See id. § 396(c)(2) (prohibiting board members from being employees of the 
United States). 
47 See Patricia M. Chuh, The Fate of Public Broadcasting in the Face of Federal Funding 
Cuts, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 207, 210 (1995) (describing the changes made to pub-
lic broadcasting during the Carter administration, such as the establishment of a trust 
fund with the Treasury). 
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own programming—and perhaps even their social and cultural mis-
sion—free from government pressure. 
II.  INDEPENDENCE DENIED?  THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL  
FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
Despite legislative emphasis on the fact that public broadcasting 
should be free from government influence, Supreme Court precedent 
indicates that the Court would consider the CPB to be a part of the 
government for First Amendment purposes.  The immediate implica-
tion is clear:  the First Amendment asserts that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”48 and the Court has ex-
tended this limitation to all of government.  Thus, decisions by a CPB 
considered to be a government entity could be subject to judicial scru-
tiny.  Furthermore, numerous decisions made at the local level (the 
“bottom” tier of the system) could also raise First Amendment ques-
tions because many stations are administered directly by state gov-
ernments.49  Subjecting public broadcasters to traditional First 
Amendment scrutiny, however, would lead to results that belie the in-
tended independence of the noncommercial system.  Such a result 
may therefore call for an alternative constitutional approach to analy-
ses of public broadcasting. 
A.  The Corporation for Public Broadcasting as Government Entity 
Although it has the title of a nonprofit “corporation” and Con-
gress clearly did not intend for it to be considered a government 
agency, the CPB’s constitutional status remains somewhat question-
able.  The General Accounting Office, for instance, included the CPB 
in its Profiles of Existing Government Corporations, indicating that it sees 
the entity as an independent part of the executive branch, similar to 
the U.S. Postal Service or the Legal Services Corporation.50  Further-
more, under Supreme Court analysis of whether an entity is a gov-
48 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
49 See infra Part IV (listing the states whose public broadcasters are run by govern-
ment agencies). 
50 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS:  PROFILES OF 
EXISTING GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS 160 (1996); see also Chris Johnson, Comment, 
Federal Support of Public Broadcasting:  Not Quite What LBJ Had in Mind, 8 COMMLAW 
CONSPECTUS 135, 140-41 (2000) (suggesting that based on its inclusion of the CPB in 
the report, the General Accounting Office considered the CPB to be a government 
corporation). 
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ernment agency for First Amendment purposes, there is strong evi-
dence that the Constitution would consider the CPB a state actor. 
The Court has implied that for First Amendment analysis, it would 
consider the CPB to be a part of the government.  In Lebron v. National 
Passenger Railroad Corp., the Court held that it considers a government 
corporation, in that case Amtrak, part of the federal government if it 
has been created by special law for the “furtherance of governmental 
objectives” and if the government has retained power to appoint a ma-
jority of its board of directors.51  The CPB certainly appears to satisfy 
these requirements, as it was established by the Public Broadcasting 
Act of 196752 and the President appoints its entire board of directors.53  
Indeed, in determining that Amtrak was part of the government in the 
eyes of the First Amendment, Lebron specifically identified the CPB as 
a point of comparison.54  Although Amtrak claimed that its charter’s 
disclaimer of agency status prevents it from attaining governmental 
status, the Court rejected that argument and held that the First 
Amendment could place limits on Amtrak’s speech-restrictive activ-
ity.55  Under this analysis, the fact that the 1967 Act asserts that it is not 
a government agency likely would not save the CPB from a judicial de-
termination that it is part of the government for First Amendment 
purposes. 
B.  First Amendment Implications of Government Agency Status 
With this potential government status in mind, under traditional 
Supreme Court analysis, application of the Court’s First Amendment 
precedents creates results that frustrate congressional intent and the 
goals of noncommercial broadcasting.  The two potential forms of 
government action in this space that would raise First Amendment 
questions are (1) direct regulation of programming choices, either by 
the federal legislature or executive branch, or by state public televi-
sion agencies; and (2) placing conditions on funding to public broad-
51 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1995). 
52 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (2000) (authorizing the establishment of the CPB). 
53 See id. § 396(c) (providing that the President shall appoint the nine-member 
board of directors, with the “advice and consent” of the Senate). 
54 Lebron, 513 U.S. at 391.  The Court also put the Legal Services Corporation in 
the same group of “government corporations” as the CPB, id., just as the General Ac-
counting Office had done in its report. 
55 See id. at 392.  The Court then remanded for a determination of whether Am-
trak abridged the plaintiff’s speech by censoring an advertisement on an Amtrak-
owned billboard.  Id. at 400. 
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casters that limit their content decision making.  Unfortunately, be-
cause of its extreme deference to government, the Supreme Court’s 
public forum analysis is unhelpful in fulfilling congressional intent.  
Application of public forum and government speech doctrines would 
lead to the result that the public broadcaster’s autonomy could be 
constitutionally abridged.  Likewise, while the Court’s approach to 
funding conditions under Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez56 initially ap-
pears to protect the editorial functions of the public broadcaster, it 
does not do enough to protect institutional independence either. 
1.  The Limitations of Public Forum Analysis and  
Government Employment Cases 
a.  Speech on Government Property:  Public Forum Doctrine 
A direct restriction on the editorial choices of a public broad-
caster is the most plausible form of action taken by a state public 
broadcasting authority administering its stations.  Ordinarily, in a 
situation where the government owns or operates particular property, 
the Court applies public forum analysis to an abridgement of speech 
within that space.  Under this “public forum doctrine,” the Court de-
cides whether the government property on which the speech occurs is 
(1) a “traditional public forum,” (2) a “designated public forum,” or 
(3) a “nonpublic forum.”57
Public property is a “traditional” public forum if it has “imme-
morially been held in trust for the use of the public,” like a street or 
public park.58  Direct regulations of speech in a traditional public fo-
rum must survive strict scrutiny review, and restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of the speech must be narrowly tailored to a “signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels 
of communication.”59  The “designated public forum” consists of 
property that the government intentionally opens for public use as a 
place for speech activity.60  Content-based speech restrictions in this 
56 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
57 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
58 Id. at 45 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (noting that traditional public fora have “‘time out of 
mind . . . been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions’” (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 
U.S. 496, 515 (1939))). 
59 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45. 
60 Id. at 45-46. 
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space, like those in traditional public forums, must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling government interest.61  Public property 
that does not fall into either of these two categories is considered a 
“nonpublic forum.”  Restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums need 
only be “reasonable” and viewpoint neutral.62
The way the Court has refined the public forum doctrine has cre-
ated significant weaknesses in this approach, however, and demon-
strates that it would be ill-suited for application to public broadcast-
ing.  When determining whether a particular space is a “designated 
public forum,” the Court asks whether the government has explicitly 
and intentionally dedicated it to free expression.63  The practical ap-
plication of this inquiry, though, raises concerns due to its circularity.  
That is, because government adoption of a rule against speech would 
itself be evidence of intention not to create a designated public forum, 
one cannot challenge the constitutionality of that rule because it is the 
very thing that makes the property a designated public forum (and 
thus allows it to receive relaxed First Amendment scrutiny).64  Thus, 
government restrictions on editorial autonomy in the public broad-
casting realm would be impervious to challenge, because the very in-
terference being challenged would cause the space to become a non-
public forum (which would be a winning case for the government).  A 
more objective analysis may therefore be necessary to counteract the 
deleterious effects of traditional forum analysis for speech generally 
and specifically preserving the independence of the public broad-
caster.  Indeed, the Court seemed to recognized as much in applying 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 46. 
63 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) 
(“The decision to create a public forum must . . . be made ‘by intentionally opening a 
nontraditional forum for public discourse.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985))); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45-
46 (describing a “category consist[ing] of public property which the State has opened 
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity” in which the state is “bound by 
the same standards [that] apply in a traditional public forum”). 
64 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (making essentially this 
argument about government “determination” of its property); see also Steven G. Gey, 
Reopening the Public Forum—From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1585 
(1998) (“[C]ontrary to the thrust of the First Amendment in other contexts, [in public 
forum doctrine] the most effective means for the government to close a forum is to 
develop a history of theoretically impermissible content-based regulation of speech in 
that forum.”); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management:  The History and The-
ory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1784 (1987) (noting the “vicious circular-
ity of the Court’s concentration on government intent” in public forum doctrine). 
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a forum-like analysis to public broadcasting in Arkansas Educational 
Television Commission v. Forbes.65
b.  Speech within a Government Agency 
First Amendment concerns also arise when the speech being 
abridged occurs within the context of government employment.  In 
this context, a court determination that the CPB or a state public 
broadcasting authority is truly a government actor for First Amend-
ment purposes has significant consequences for speech.  Once the en-
tity is so defined, restrictions on speech are generally more permissi-
ble than in the private realm.  In Connick v. Myers, for instance, the 
Court held that a government employee could be fired for speech that 
was disruptive of the operation of the office.66  Connick indicated that 
government could legitimately regulate speech within its own agencies 
if that speech conflicted with its asserted goals.67  Professor Baker pos-
its that this approach follows a general trend begun by Grayned v. City 
of Rockford,68 which asked if the expression involved was “basically in-
compatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular 
time.”69  Robert Post takes a more restrictive view of the doctrine, sug-
gesting that in the “managerial domains” of government agencies, 
speech is properly subordinated to the goals of the government en-
tity.70
The negative potential for public broadcasting in this context is 
fairly self-evident.  If the public broadcasting system (at least, at the 
65 523 U.S. 666 (1998).  Forbes’s treatment of public broadcasters within the ill-
fitting public forum doctrine provides the basis of my proposal for an objective institu-
tional analysis.  See infra Part III. 
66 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (“The limited First Amendment interest involved here 
does not require that [the employer] tolerate action which [it] reasonably believed 
would disrupt the office, undermine [its] authority, and destroy close working rela-
tionships.”). 
67 Id. at 146. 
68 408 U.S. 104 (1972).  Grayned evaluated a city ordinance on noise trucks by ask-
ing whether the expression “is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a par-
ticular place at a particular time.”  Id. at 116. 
69 Id. at 116; see also C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1998) (arguing for a “broadened version of the princi-
ple developed in Grayned v. City of Rockford . . . a condition that restricts a constitution-
ally protected activity should only be permissible if the activity is fundamentally im-
compatible with the purpose for which the government makes the resource available”). 
70 See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:  DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, 
MANAGEMENT 247-52 (1995) (distinguishing between “management” and “govern-
ance” as types of authority within government institutions). 
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CPB and state commission levels) is truly a government entity for First 
Amendment purposes, actors motivated by undue political pressure 
could legitimately act to suppress speech within the public broadcast-
ing institution by manipulating its stated goals.71  Thus, like its public 
forum analysis, the Court’s government employee speech analysis 
would fail to fully insulate the editorial independence of noncommer-
cial broadcasters. 
2.  Funding Conditions and the First Amendment:   
Is Velazquez Useful to Public Broadcasting? 
Although public forum doctrine seems to leave significant poten-
tial for direct government intrusion into public broadcasting, there is 
still hope for protection against government conditions on funding 
under Supreme Court precedent.  In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 
the Court held that the federal government could not impose funding 
conditions that limited the speech of Legal Services Corporation 
(LSC) attorneys in a way that prevented them from fully performing 
their jobs.72  Distinguishing its decision in Rust v. Sullivan,73 the Court 
asserted that the government could not define the contours of a fund-
ing program using restrictions that distort the “usual functioning” of a 
medium of expression.74  Because the restrictions on LSC’s funding 
prohibited attorneys from making certain arguments—such as chal-
lenging the constitutionality of welfare rulings—that might be neces-
sary to effective representation of their clients, the government regu-
lation was deemed impermissible under the First Amendment.75
71 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 
(2006), demonstrates that the Court’s approach continues to support this conclusion.  
The majority in Garcetti, which included newly appointed Chief Justice Roberts and Jus-
tice Alito, held that statements made by public employees in the course of their official 
duties are not insulated from employer retaliation by the First Amendment.  Id. at 
1960.  The Court reasoned that when speaking pursuant to the duties of their em-
ployment, such employees are not “citizens” entitled to full First Amendment protec-
tion.  Id. at 1958. 
72 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (“Where private speech is involved, even Congress’ 
antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought in-
imical to the Government’s own interest.”). 
73 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
74 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543. 
75 See id. at 548 (“The attempted restriction is designed to insulate the Govern-
ment’s interpretation of the Constitution from judicial challenge.  The Constitution 
does not permit the Government to confine litigants and their attorneys in this man-
ner.”). 
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If the government were to create a similar funding condition for 
public broadcasting limiting its content choices, Velazquez would ap-
pear to say that such a restriction violates the First Amendment.76  In-
deed, the Velazquez majority explicitly referred to the Court’s public 
broadcasting cases as support for its argument, stating that, “[t]he 
First Amendment forbade the Government from using the [public 
broadcasting] forum in an unconventional way to suppress speech in-
herent in the nature of the medium.”77  With this in mind, whether 
the Court would consider the CPB a government agency becomes par-
ticularly important.  If it is a government agency, then the CPB itself, 
in addition to the legislature or executive, could be prohibited from 
placing conditions on funding for individual broadcasters that distort 
their usual functioning. 
Analyzing such a situation, however, brings to light a shortcoming 
of the Velazquez analysis with respect to the public broadcasting system.  
While that case inquires into whether the limitation countervails an 
institution’s “usual functioning,” it provides little guidance for how, 
outside the facts before it, one determines what that functioning is.  In 
Velazquez, determining the role of the LSC lawyer was fairly straight-
forward, particularly as “effective assistance” has at least some indis-
putable basic contours.78  Applying the Court’s analysis to a public 
broadcaster, however, would be less clear.  As we have seen, Congress 
itself conceived of numerous roles for public broadcasting in the 
communications order and in society generally.79  Furthermore, if the 
protected function of the public broadcaster is the exercise of edito-
rial discretion (as the Court seems to imply by referring to League of 
76 See Andrew D. Cotlar, Say Cheese:  The Constitutionality of State-Mandated Free Air-
time on Public Broadcasting Stations in Wisconsin, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 55, 76-77 (2003) (ar-
guing that under Velazquez, Wisconsin public broadcasting statutes are impermissible 
because they violate editorial independence). 
77 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543.  The Court cited its consideration of the “dynamics of 
the broadcast industry” in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364 
(1984) and Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).  
These cases are examined in greater detail in Part III, infra, but for this Part’s purposes 
note that those cases did not, in fact, deal with funding conditions and are thus not 
directly on point for this analysis.  Rather, they applied the First Amendment’s restric-
tions to direct government regulation of speech and access, respectively. 
78 Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 544 (“[LSC] lawyers funded in the government program 
may not undertake representation in suits for benefits if they must advise clients re-
specting the questionable validity of a statute which defines benefit eligibility and the 
payment structure.  The limitation forecloses advice or legal assistance to question the 
validity of statutes under the Constitution of the United States.”). 
79 See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (noting the various purposes of 
public broadcasting asserted in the 1967 Act’s text and legislative history). 
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Women Voters and Forbes), we still need an operative principle on which 
to make that choice.80  In the conditional funding context, Velazquez is 
thus of limited use to a First Amendment analysis of any potential 
government action against public broadcasting. 
Unfortunately, traditional First Amendment jurisprudence ap-
pears to be of little help to the cause of editorial autonomy that Con-
gress intended to promote for public broadcasting.  Public forum doc-
trine and government speech cases provide a level of deference to the 
government that would in many cases allow direct government inter-
vention into programming choices.  While the government’s—and 
possibly the CPB’s—potential power to place speech-restrictive condi-
tions on funding seems limited by Velazquez, the case cannot be cited 
to fully protect editorial autonomy.  Thus, for congressional intent to 
be preserved, an alternative approach to the institution of public 
broadcasting is required. 
III.  AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH:  LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, FORBES, 
AND OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
As we have seen, traditional First Amendment analysis of speech 
related to government property, employment, and funding conditions 
leaves open the possibility that the government could constitutionally 
abridge the speech choices of public broadcasters.  This result, which 
is antithetical to original congressional intention, is bolstered by—if 
not grounded in—the likelihood that the Court could consider public 
broadcasters to be part of the government.  For the public broadcast-
ing system’s First Amendment status to more closely resemble what 
Congress intended in designing the institution, then, a new approach 
is needed. 
Fortunately, the Court has provided an indication of how it might 
view public broadcasting for First Amendment purposes in FCC v. 
League of Women Voters of California81 and Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes.82  These cases imply that when determining how 
the First Amendment will apply to public broadcasting, the Court 
should look not at the government’s own asserted interests but instead 
at the objective characteristics of how the institution is organized.  As 
we have seen, the potential functions of the public broadcaster are di-
80 Part III, infra, takes up the task of finding such a principle. 
81 468 U.S. 364. 
82 523 U.S. 666. 
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verse, and there is not a clear, principled way to favor any particular 
one.  Instead, by focusing on the one attribute that is built into the 
structure of the system—editorial autonomy—the Court can preserve 
all these social capabilities of the public broadcaster and maximize 
protection of speech. 
This Part will thus examine how League of Women Voters and Forbes 
provide analytical support for such an objective approach to speech 
institutions under the First Amendment.  It will then explain how such 
an approach not only fills in the gaps of existing First Amendment 
analysis but also makes the jurisprudence more coherent, creates 
more desirable results for the public broadcasting system, and pre-
serves Congress’s original intent. 
A.  The Public Broadcasting Cases and the Objective Approach 
The Court’s public broadcasting cases lend support to this objec-
tive analysis through their emphasis on the fact that public broadcast-
ers should be accorded the same editorial discretion as commercial 
broadcasters.  Although neither opinion explicitly purports to do so, 
the Court implicitly recognizes that the objective characteristics of the 
public broadcaster provide an effective way of defining its status in the 
eyes of the First Amendment.  The Court thus works to preserve the 
independence of noncommercial broadcasting by noting that the 
structure of public broadcasting gives its programming choices, under 
the First Amendment, the same constitutional protection as those of 
private entities. 
1.  FCC v. League of Women Voters 
In a five to four decision, League of Women Voters overturned as un-
constitutional section 399 of the amended Communications Act of 
1934, which prohibited noncommercial broadcasters from editorializ-
ing.83  The majority introduced its First Amendment scrutiny by stat-
ing that “although the Government’s interest in ensuring balanced 
coverage of public issues is plainly both important and substantial, we 
have . . . made clear that broadcasters are engaged in a vital and inde-
83 League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 402.  The provision—introduced by the Pub-
lic Broadcasting Act of 1967—also prohibited noncommercial broadcast stations from 
supporting or opposing candidates for political office.  This part of the provision, how-
ever, was not challenged on appeal.  Id. at 371 n.9. 
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pendent form of communicative activity.”84  The analysis that followed 
involved a thorough explication of the extensive ways in which the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting and Public Broadcasting System 
were organized to maximize their insulation from political pressures 
in government.85  Thus, according to the Court, the institution cre-
ated by the Public Broadcasting Act “would be as insulated from fed-
eral interference as the wholly private stations.”86  In striking down the 
relevant provision of section 399, the Court then held that it was an 
insufficiently justified “abridgment of important journalistic freedoms 
which the First Amendment jealously protects.”87
In its analysis, the League of Women Voters Court appears to be tell-
ing Congress that because it structured public broadcasting in a way 
that so closely resembles commercial broadcasting, the First Amend-
ment protects journalistic discretion in the same way for both.  In 
other words, the legislature cannot build a public broadcasting system 
around the principle of autonomy enjoyed by all broadcasters and 
then seek to violate that same independence by restricting editorial 
speech, a crucial element of independent journalism.  Though the 
Court does not state it directly, implicit in this conclusion is the idea 
that the Court will define an institution’s functioning and status (i.e., 
government entity or not) based on how it was objectively organized, 
not based on the interest asserted by the government at the time of 
litigation. 
2.  Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 
Like League of Women Voters, the Court in Forbes declined to distin-
guish between commercial and noncommercial broadcasters when it 
came to applying First Amendment principles.  Forbes reviewed a First 
Amendment challenge against the Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission’s (AETC) decision to exclude an independent candidate 
from a televised political debate.88  Though it was not explicitly part of 
his analysis, Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion with a brief 
84 Id. at 378 (emphasis added). 
85 The Court referenced, inter alia, the private, bipartisan structure of the Corpo-
ration for Public Broadcasting and cited extensive legislative history indicating the in-
tention to grant maximum independence to public broadcasters.  See id. at 386-95. 
86 Id. at 394. 
87 Id. at 402. 
88 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670-71 (1998). 
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acknowledgement of the way the AETC was organized by statute.89  
Specifically, he pointed to the fact that members of the AETC are 
barred from holding any federal or state office and that the Commis-
sion employs a staff of professional journalists.90  Furthermore, the 
opinion made particular note of the fact that the AETC employed a 
“Statement of Principles of Editorial Integrity in Public Broadcasting, 
which counsel adherence to generally accepted broadcasting industry 
standards, so that the programming service is free from pressure from 
political . . . supporters.”91
The Court went on to determine that public broadcasting was not 
a public forum under its forum analysis.92  If the public broadcaster 
were a government actor for constitutional purposes, this result would 
surely not hold under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, 
which sees viewpoint discrimination by government actors as anath-
ema.93  The Court explained that if it applied public forum principles 
like it does for government entities, “[p]rogramming decisions would 
be particularly vulnerable to claims of [viewpoint discrimination] be-
cause even principled exclusions rooted in sound journalistic judg-
ment can often be characterized as viewpoint based.”94  The fact that 
the AETC was nominally a government actor, then, clearly did not 
guide the First Amendment analysis in Forbes.  What does explain the 
Court’s conclusions, though, is the idea that the Court should look at 
the objective characteristics of an institution to determine its First 
Amendment status.  That the AETC was organized to be insulated 
from political pressures likely did much of the work in Forbes.  This 
would explain why the Court gave public broadcasting the same First 
Amendment treatment it gives private speakers. 
An objective analysis of the institutions at work in the case also 
explains why the Court viewed the debates themselves as distinct from 
other programming decisions “rooted” in editorial judgment.  The 
majority held that unlike other programming, the debate was a non-
89 Id. at 669-70. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
92 Id. at 678-80 (noting that the government did not intend to make the opportu-
nity generally available to a class of speakers, and that AETC reserved the power to de-
termine a participant’s eligibility). 
93 See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (holding that a 
city ordinance whose “operative distinction” was the subject matter of the speech vio-
lated the First Amendment). 
94 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673. 
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public forum (and thus subject to the Court’s developed forum analy-
sis) because of its “special characteristics.”95  Justice Kennedy again 
examined the structural characteristics of this electoral institution, 
noting that “the debate was by design a forum for political speech by 
the candidates.”96  Given the sensitivity to imposing obligations of a 
political nature on a public broadcaster inherent in its design, the in-
stitutional separation that results from the Court’s analysis here makes 
sense.  Although the debate was a form of programming—and re-
quired basic editorial decision making about the setup—just like 
other types of content, its inherent structural characteristics made it 
(in the eyes of the Court’s First Amendment analysis) a debate, not a 
television show.  The distinction demonstrates, then, the Court’s will-
ingness to extend an inquiry into the physical characteristics of a space 
to the organizational structure of the institutions at work in a given situa-
tion and separate them accordingly.97
In dissent, Justice Stevens vigorously stressed the importance of 
the fact that the AETC was state owned, asserting that the majority 
“understates the constitutional importance of the distinction between 
state ownership and private ownership of broadcast facilities.”98  Un-
derlying his objections to the Court’s treatment of the public broad-
caster as a de facto private entity under the First Amendment was Jus-
tice Stevens’s concern that the AETC—an arm of the state executive 
branch—would be able to subjectively define the scope of its own dis-
cretion.  He noted that, “[b]ecause AETC is owned by the State, def-
erence to its interest in making ad hoc decisions about the political 
content of its programs necessarily increases the risk of government 
censorship and propaganda in a way that protection of privately 
owned broadcasters does not.”99
Justice Stevens’s arguments and concerns about the editorial deci-
sion making of the AETC are countered, though, by an analytical 
principle that inquires not into the subjective intent of the state-
owned broadcaster, but the objective organization of that entity.  
95 Id. at 676. 
96 Id. at 675 (emphasis added) (“[C]andidate debates present the narrow excep-
tion to the rule [that public broadcasting is not a public forum] . . . [because] a candi-
date debate . . . is different from other programming.”). 
97 See Part III.B.2.a, infra, for a discussion of how this analysis extends a similar 
objective inquiry into other public forum cases. 
98 Forbes, 523 U.S. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. at 689.  Justice Stevens expressed particular concern about that fact that 
Forbes’s constitutional claim was being rejected “on the basis of [AETC’s] entirely sub-
jective, ad hoc judgments about the dimensions of its forum.”  Id. at 690. 
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Thus, the fact that the AETC was structured to pursue journalistic—not 
political—goals indicates that the Court could proceed differently if 
political pressures clearly did drive content decisions and not stan-
dards of journalistic discretion.  Such a consideration of the structure 
of the public broadcaster would then alleviate Stevens’s concerns that 
the AETC could be used as a mouthpiece for the ruling political party. 
In both League of Women Voters and Forbes, the Court declined to 
consider public broadcasters to be government entities.  Instead, rec-
ognition of the fact that they were organized in a way that was consis-
tent with independent private and autonomous broadcasters led to the 
conclusion that noncommercial broadcast speech would receive simi-
larly relaxed First Amendment scrutiny. 
B.  Implications of the Objective Approach for First Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Court need not accept an objective approach for the sole 
purpose of realizing the intended structure of public broadcasting.  
An objective approach can provide a meaningful solution where First 
Amendment analysis fails to provide robust protection of speech or 
suffers from circular logic.  Furthermore, such a method has already, 
in fact, been employed in First Amendment analysis of expressive in-
stitutions outside the public broadcasting context and would thus be 
more likely to gain acceptance by a majority of the Court.  Examining 
the objective attributes of a government agency or government-
funded entity offers clearer guidance on how to apply the Court’s 
precedents in several doctrinal areas. 
1.  Situating the Objective Approach Within the First Amendment 
Landscape:  Keller v. State Bar of California 
The Court has previously used an objective analytical procedure 
instead of giving deference to government assertions about its inter-
ests in an expressive institution.  In Keller v. State Bar of California, the 
Court considered whether the California Bar association violated the 
First Amendment by using compulsory membership dues to fund lob-
bying and other ideological activities with which some members dis-
agreed.100  The California Supreme Court had ruled that the bar asso-
ciation was a regulated governmental agency, and this status allowed it 
to use its dues for any legitimate purpose, without First Amendment 
100 496 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990). 
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constraint.101  Reversing that decision, a unanimous Supreme Court 
disregarded the fact that the bar was a regulated state agency, looking 
instead at its “specialized characteristics” that “distinguish it from the 
role of the typical government official or agency.”102
In determining whether the state bar was in fact a government en-
tity for First Amendment purposes, the Court considered, inter alia, 
the types of services the bar provided and the relationship between 
the institution and its constituency.103  Based on these characteristics, 
it found a “substantial analogy” between the state bar and employee 
unions, explicitly disagreeing that the bar association acted like a gov-
ernment agency.104  Because it was organized in a way that closely re-
sembled unions, the Court proceeded on the assumption that the bar 
association should be accorded the same constitutional status as un-
ions, at least with respect to the First Amendment.105  Thus, applying 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education106 and its progeny, the Court held 
that the organization could not use mandatory dues to pay for those 
activities not “germane” to the reasons for which the state bar exists.107
As a result, the Court appears to embrace an approach that exam-
ines the objective characteristics of the entity to determine how the 
First Amendment will apply to it.  Indeed, the Court explained that 
this lack of deference to the government’s assertions rested upon a 
general jurisprudential principle: 
 Of course the Supreme Court of California is the final authority on 
the “governmental” status of the State Bar of California for purposes of 
state law.  But its determination that respondent is a “government 
agency,” and therefore entitled to the treatment accorded a governor, a 
101 Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 767 P.2d 1020, 1029 (1989). 
102 Keller, 496 U.S. at 12. 
103 Id. at 11-12. 
104 Id. at 12 (“There is . . . a substantial analogy between the relationship of the 
State Bar and its members, on the one hand, and the relationship of employee unions 
and their members, on the other.”). 
105 See id. at 12 (noting that just as agency-shop laws may permissibly prevent the 
benefits negotiated by union members to spill over to free-riding, nonunion members, 
lawyers—all of whom benefit from the bar association’s work—might be required to 
pay a “fair share” of the association’s costs irrespective of the First Amendment). 
106 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  Abood upheld “agency-shop” rules that compelled teach-
ers to pay union membership dues even if the union engaged in ideological activities 
with which the teacher disagreed.  Id. at 235.  However, the union could not, consis-
tent with the First Amendment, fund those activities with the mandatory dues collected 
from teachers.  Id. at 235-36.  This essentially required the unions to keep segregated 
funds going forward. 
107 Keller, 496 U.S. at 13-14. 
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mayor, or a state tax commission, for instance, is not binding on us when 
such a determination is essential to the decision of a federal question.
108
In the public broadcasting context, then, the Court could employ 
Keller’s analysis to determine whether a state broadcasting commission 
would actually be a government entity for constitutional purposes.  An 
objective approach could thus lead to a determination, contrary to the 
implications of Lebron, that the First Amendment protects the auton-
omy of the public broadcaster as a nongovernmental entity. 
2.  Addressing the Shortcomings of Traditional  
First Amendment Analysis 
a.  Public Forum Doctrine and Government Employee Cases 
An analysis of public broadcasting’s objective characteristics would 
redress the circularity inherent in the Court’s tendency to make de-
terminations about forum category based on the government’s subjec-
tive intention.  In fact, Justice Kennedy advocated a similar approach 
in his opinion in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee 
(ISKCON).  Although he concurred in the result, Kennedy noted that 
the Court’s analysis was flawed because it asserted that the “public fo-
rum status of public property depends on the government’s defined 
purpose for the property, or on an explicit decision by the govern-
ment to dedicate the property to expressive activity.”109  The correct 
inquiry, in his view, “must be an objective one, based on the actual, 
physical characteristics and uses of the property.”110  Speech should be 
protected, Justice Kennedy argued, so long as it is not incompatible 
with those objective attributes and uses.111  A similar objective analysis 
was likely driving Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Forbes, as that case con-
tained no mention of the subjective forum principles to which he ob-
jected in ISKCON and appeared to acknowledge the editorial auton-
108 Id. at 11. 
109 Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 698 (“If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and 
the actual public uses and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate 
that expressive activity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses, the prop-
erty is a public forum.”). 
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omy inherent in the creation of public broadcasting.112  In a way, Forbes 
further extended Kennedy’s analysis of the objective characteristics of 
the physical space in ISKCON to the organizational structures of differ-
ent institutions operating within that space.113
This inquiry into what type of entity the government objectively 
created applies to government employee cases as well, particularly 
under the analyses in this area by Professors Baker and Post.  Examin-
ing the objective characteristics of a government entity would enable 
courts to undertake an analysis of compatibility between the entity’s 
efficient operation and the restrictions imposed on speech.114  In Con-
nick, for example, determining the level of disruption caused by em-
ployee speech required an assessment of what the government was ac-
tually trying to do in maintaining the agency office.  If this 
determination is based purely on the interests proffered by the gov-
ernment at trial, however, speech will never be protected, for the 
same reasons that plague the Court’s forum analysis.  Instead, the ob-
jective characteristics of the space—its organizational structure, the 
contractual job descriptions given to employees, etc.—provide the 
neutral principle that maximizes speech protection.  Thus, were the 
public broadcaster to be considered a government agency for First 
Amendment purposes, the fact that Congress endowed the broad-
caster with the structural characteristics of an autonomous body 
should lead courts to preserve its editorial independence. 
b.  Analyzing Conditions on Funding 
An approach that considers the objective characteristics of an in-
stitution would also give greater clarity to the Court’s analysis of 
speech-related conditions on government funding.  While Velazquez 
prohibits speech restrictions that contravene the “usual functioning” 
of an institution, the Court did not offer any guidance on how to de-
termine that function.115  Focusing on what the legislature objectively 
112 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (“Public and 
private broadcasters alike are not only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise sub-
stantial editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their programming.”). 
113 See supra Part III.A.2. 
114 See Baker, supra note 69, at 9-10 (“[A] condition that restricts a constitutionally 
protected activity should only be permissible if the activity is fundamentally incompati-
ble with the purpose for which the government makes the resources available.”). 
115 Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 543 (2001) (noting the diffi-
culty of defining the customary functions of the public broadcaster, considering how 
  
1016 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 991 
 
created, however, provides a framework for that analysis and still re-
stricts the extent to which government can define the scope of a fund-
ing program.  Thus, a consideration of the “usual functioning” of a 
public broadcaster would begin with an inquiry into how the public 
broadcasting system was constructed.  Consequently, the autonomy 
built into the system by statute would be given full effect in the face of 
potential speech-related conditions on federal funding. 
IV.  APPLYING THE OBJECTIVE APPROACH:   
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
Having seen how an analysis of public broadcasting’s objective 
characteristics is useful for determining its First Amendment status, 
the empirical question remains as to how such an approach would ap-
ply to the public broadcast system.  This Part briefly considers how a 
reviewing court would scrutinize the structure of a public broadcast-
ing entity.  Although they are interconnected within the U.S. system, 
and Congress desired autonomy for both, the federal and state levels 
of public broadcasting face somewhat distinct hypothetical challenges 
to their independence.  Thus, this Part will begin with a brief exami-
nation of the organizational structure of the CPB at the federal level 
and its implications for First Amendment analysis.  It then performs 
the same analysis at the state level, using New Jersey public broadcast-
ing as a sample case. 
A.  The Structure of Public Broadcasting at the Federal Level 
As has already been described, with the Public Broadcasting Act of 
1967, Congress structured the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
intending to maximize the editorial autonomy of public broadcast-
ing.116  Indeed, the CPB’s structural elements bear out this intention 
and ground that autonomy in objective attributes.  For instance, the 
CPB has an internal system of governance, organized to have a politi-
cally diverse membership117 serving staggered, limited terms.118  These 
many roles it is supposed to play in society according to congressional mandate); see 
supra Part II.B.2. 
116 See supra Part I (noting the creation of a CPB trust, and that in the selection 
process for the CPB’s Board of Directors, the President cannot base his selection on 
political affiliation). 
117 See 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1) (2000) (“No more than 5 members of the Board ap-
pointed by the President may be members of the same political party.”). 
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features imbue the entity with an autonomy not enjoyed by other gov-
ernment agencies, whose leadership can easily be removed at the will 
of the executive branch.  Therefore, the CPB should not be consid-
ered a government entity for First Amendment purposes, regardless of 
the result under state action doctrine.  This conclusion would give 
recognition to the fact that Congress found the autonomy of the 
broadcaster to be so important that they built it into the organiza-
tional structure of the institution. 
Furthermore, the fact that the CPB is prohibited from using po-
litical criteria to select officers and employees,119 combined with the 
bipartisanship of its directorship mandated by statute, demonstrates 
that the “usual functioning” of the public broadcaster depends on its 
ability to make editorial decisions free from partisan interests.  Under 
Velazquez, then, this analysis could prohibit a CPB director (such as the 
chairman) from placing content-based restrictions on program fund-
ing that were motivated by political concerns.  Thus, though the CPB 
may nominally be considered a “government agency” under the 
Court’s state action doctrine, determinations of the validity of pro-
gramming decisions must be screened for their separation from parti-
san interests, consistent with the structure and functioning of the or-
ganization. 
B.  The Structure of Public Broadcasting at the State Level 
A large number of state public broadcasting systems are super-
vised by state-operated independent commissions.120  Of these, New 
Jersey’s system is typical; it provides a useful test case because it is one 
of the relatively few state systems whose activity has faced constitu-
118 Id. § 396(c)(5) (providing for six-year terms for members of the Board of Di-
rectors). 
119 Id. § 396(e)(2) (“[N]o political test or qualification shall be used in select-
ing . . . officers, agents, and employees of the Corporation.”). 
120 For examples of state statutory provisions creating state-operated independent 
commissions to monitor state public broadcasting systems, see ALA. CODE §§ 16-7-1 to 
16-7-5 (LexisNexis 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-3-101 to 6-3-105 (1999); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-13-1(a) (2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 256.84 (West 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
168.010 (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2501 (2001); MD. CODE ANN., 
EDUC. §§ 24-201 to 24-207 (LexisNexis 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-63-1 (West 1999); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-1313 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-3 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 16-61-2(a) (1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-7-10 (2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-5-2 
(LexisNexis 2003).  See also Cotlar, supra note 76, at 57-58 & n.6 (providing an overview 
of statewide public broadcasting systems in the United States).
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tional challenge.121  By state statute, New Jersey’s system is supervised 
and controlled by the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Commission.122  
Though the Commission is explicitly “established in the Executive 
Branch of the State Government,” like the 1967 Act’s description of 
the CPB, the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority Act of 1968 
makes a nominal attempt to assert the Commission’s independence 
from the government.123  As we have seen, however, it is not entirely 
clear that this would be controlling for First Amendment purposes.124  
Thus, a consideration of the objective characteristics of the Commis-
sion is useful to determine the constitutional standards that would ap-
ply. 
Despite its apparent creation as a government entity, the Commis-
sion has an internal structure of democratic governance that ensures 
its decisions will be made independent of political pressure.  While 
five members of the fifteen-member Commission must be administra-
tive officials, a large majority (ten members) are private New Jersey 
residents.125  These citizen-members serve staggered terms of five years 
each and must be selected “without regard to political belief or affilia-
tion.”126  The Commission elects its own officers, including the chair-
man and vice chairman, by an internal vote of its members.127
That the Commission has its own governance and cannot be se-
lected based on political affiliation strongly indicates that it should be 
insulated from partisan pressures under the First Amendment.  Like 
the AETC in Forbes, such a self-sufficient structure connotes a degree 
of autonomy that would be violated if the Commission were treated by 
a traditional First Amendment analysis taken under the assumption 
that the public broadcaster is a government actor.128  Furthermore, by 
121 See McGlynn v. N.J. Pub. Broad. Auth., 439 A.2d 54, 63 (N.J. 1981) (clarifying 
the “balance, fairness and equity” provision of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-7(h)); Arons v. 
N.J. Network, 775 A.2d 778, 784 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that under 
the statutory provisions, the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority has discretion 
with respect to balanced news coverage and related programming). 
122 N.J. STAT. ANN.  § 48:23-4(a). 
123 Id. § 48:23-3 (“[T]he authority is hereby allocated within the Department of 
Public Utilities, but notwithstanding said allocation, the authority shall be independent 
of any supervision or control by the department or by any board or officer thereof.”).
124 See supra Part II.A. 
125 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:23-4(b).
126 Id. § 48:23-4(c).
127 Id. § 48:23-4(f).
128 See supra Part III.A.2 (noting that an objective analysis of the institutions in-
volved likely drove the Court’s separation of the debate forum from other program-
ming). 
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considering the organizational structure of the broadcaster in an ob-
jective way to help determine its “usual functionings,” the Court could 
very well be hostile to any editorial decisions made in the name of par-
tisan concerns.  That is, if the broadcasting institution is organized in 
such a way as to be insulated by pressure from ruling political inter-
ests, then any decisions made as a result of that pressure may be inva-
lid under the First Amendment. 
Of course, defining what is a “legitimate” exercise of editorial dis-
cretion is a broad subject of debate about the social role of journal-
ism.  While that debate is outside the scope of this Comment, it is im-
portant to note that by focusing on the institutional autonomy clearly 
imbued in the structure of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Com-
mission, objective First Amendment analysis allows the broadcasters, 
rather than the government, to define their role and respond to the 
needs of the community.  Regardless of how that role is defined, deci-
sions made in the name of partisan interests—rather than accepted 
standards of editorial discretion—should be struck down under Ve-
lazquez and League of Women Voters.129
CONCLUSION 
Incidents like the one that led to Kenneth Tomlinson’s resigna-
tion as the CPB Chairman certainly raise important concerns about 
the governance of public broadcasting in the United States.  That 
Congress intended the U.S. system of public broadcasting to be walled 
off from partisan concerns is without question, and when that wall is 
breached, the integrity of the system is called into question.  An objec-
tive jurisprudential approach under the First Amendment provides 
hope for a solution, though.  Traditional First Amendment analysis 
puts the nongovernmental status of public broadcasting into question, 
and fails to fully protect the editorial autonomy Congress envisioned 
with the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.  Consistent with the Court’s 
decisions in Forbes and League of Women Voters, however, an analysis that 
asks what exactly is created, based on objective criteria of the structure, 
more fully achieves this congressional intent.  An application of this 
principle to the state and federal tiers of the public broadcasting sys-
129 Analysis of the objective characteristics of the New Jersey Public Broadcasting 
Commission further supports this proposition, as its individual employees (including 
journalists and in-house content providers) must be chosen “solely on grounds of fit-
ness to perform their duties” and not based on party affiliation.  N.J. STAT. ANN.  
§ 48:23-6 (West 1998).
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tem would allow courts to recognize public broadcasting autonomy 
while shielding against partisan influence on content decisions.  Thus, 
with its autonomy secure, public broadcasting would be free under 
the First Amendment to fully explore the myriad social roles Congress 
envisioned, free from government influence. 
 
